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Institutional Reform in the Federal Courts
ALAN BETrEN*

The fear that haunts me with a hopeless obstinacy is a nightmare that
would cause every lawyer or law student to quake. It is that one morning
we will look out the window and see nothing but Federal Reporters rising
shelves and shelves of them, stretching from
from the earth to the heavens,
1
one horizon to the other.
By virtue of our Constitution, Congress has the power to define both
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.2 Congress has found it proper to add to the
jurisdiction of these various federal courts, 3 but rarely has Congress
exercised its constitutional right to withdraw such jurisdiction. 4 Since the
mid-1960's, however, much discussion within Congress and among other
interested groups has concerned the need for a basic revision and
redistribution of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. To a large extent,
the discussion has been prompted by the law explosion and by the
overloaded dockets found at all levels of our federal and state judiciaries.
Some commentators freely admit that they cannot adequately account for
this sudden and staggering rise in caseloads. 5 Other commentators, such as
Judge Friendly, state that any explanations might include prior decisions
of the courts, the attitudes of the litigants, and the multitude of substantive
rights newly created by congressional legislation. 6 Still other commentators, while not advancing explanations for the problem, have partially
demonstrated that, contrary to conventional wisdom, litigation rates in the
federal district courts 7 do not necessarily parallel increasing economic
growth or population.
*BA. 1973, Brown University; J.D. 1976, University of Maryland School of Law; M.A.
1976, The Johns Hopkins University; Ph.D. Candidate, The Johns Hopkins University.
I would like to thank Professor Alan Hornstein of the University of Maryland School of
Law and Professor J. Woodford Howard, Jr. of The Johns Hopkins University for their
comments concerning earlier drafts of this paper.
'Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate
System,2 59 CORNELL L. REv. 576 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Planned Flexibility].
U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
3See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (establishing the federal court system); Act of
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470; Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1970).
4But see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
sCarrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 542, 543 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Crowded Dockets].
6H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION: A GENERAL VIEW 17-27 (1973).
7
Grossman & Sarat, Litigation in the FederalCourts: A ComparativePerspective, 9 LAw
& Soc'Y REv. 321-23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Litigation in the Federal Courts].
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Regardless of the underlying causes of this explosion the federal
judiciary faces an immense problem. In order to grasp the enormity of the
situation one need only state some elementary statistics.8 In 1960 federal
district court filings totaled 89,112; in 1975 they totaled 160,602. 9 This is an
increase of about 4,800 filings per year. While the number of criminal cases
filed rose about 25 percent from 1964 to 1974, the number of civil case filings
increased 55 percent in the same time period.' 0 Furthermore, the rise in the
number of criminal filings was accompanied by a 60 percent increase in the
number of defendants who went to trial." Other specific types of case
2
filings showed even greater growth rates.'
The crisis is worse at the court of appeals level; while there were 3,899
appeals filed in 1960,13 1975 filings totaled 16,658.14 Filings thus rose about
332 percent in the same period as district court filings increased about 80
percent.
The number of cases disposed of after oral argument or
submission on brief, a figure revealing more about the actual workload of
these courts, showed an increase from 2,681 cases in 196015 to 9,077 cases in
1975.16 Much of this workload increase has been caused by a sharp increase
in criminal appeals. 17 In the 1970-1975 period alone criminal case filings
rose 57 percent, from 2,660 cases to 4,187 cases.' 8 Furthermore, while about
33 percent of the convicted defendants appealed in 1964, by 1974 almost 75
percent appealed to the courts of appeals.' 9
This article examines some problems of institutional reform of the
federal judiciary and assumes that such administrative changes can have
great effect upon both the caseload and the quality of the decisions of the
federal courts. Although some of the changes discussed might well be
8
Throughout this paper, district court and court of appeals caseload figures refer to
fiscal years, while Supreme Court caseload statistics refer to Terms of the Court.
9

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS, 189 (1975) [hereinafter dted as A.O. ANN. REP. (1975)].
10Burger, Annual Report on the State of the judiciary, 61 A.B.A.J. 439 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Burger, Annual Report].
"Id.
12For example, civil rights cases increased from 296 in 1961, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 241 (1961), to 10,392

in 1975 (of which 1,355 were U.S. civil rights suits and 9,037 were private actions) A.O. ANN.
REP. (1975), supra note 9, at 349, 354. Prisoner petitions increased from 2,609 in 1961, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 241

(1961), to 19,307 in 1975, A.O. ANN. REP. (1975), supra note 9 at 207.
13ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, 150 (1960) [hereinafter cited as A.O. ANN. REP. (1960)]
14A.O. ANN. REP. (1975), supra note 9, at 323.
15A.O. ANN. REP. (1960), supra note 13, at 150.
16A.O. ANN. REP. (1975), supra note 9, at 323.

17Some of this increase in appeals might, in turn, be attributed to the Supreme Court's
decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 7238 (1967) (requiring an appointed counsel to file an
appeal if non-frivolous), and to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970), which
provides for appointed counsel in the federal courts. See also Goldman, FederalDistrictCourts
and the Appellate Crisis,57 JUDICATURE 211, 212 (1973).
19United States v. MacCollum, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2098, n.8 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(1976); Burger, Annual Report, supra note 10, at 440.

1976]

FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

implemented by the district courts, this article will focus on institutional
and administrative changes concerning the federal appellate courts.
The first section examines caseflow through the federal court system in
order to note whether current proposals for federal court reform are based
upon correct perceptions of the roles played by the courts of appeals and
the Supreme Court. Various intracourt reforms which might be implemented by the courts of appeals are then analyzed in the second section.
The third section discusses the screening process and growing docket of the
Supreme Court, the effect of various reform proposals upon them, and
other possible methods by which the Court can continue its conflictresolving and policymaking roles.
I.

RELATIONSHIPS AND ROLES OF THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

Implicit in most discussions concerning the federal court system is a
hierarchical model which assumes that authoritative decisions are made by
the Supreme Court and are then applied by the lower federal courts. Such
a model suggests that public law is the product only of Supreme Court
decisions. A second model of the system is that of a bureucracy in which
the Supreme Court makes important decisions and the lower federal courts
implement them to varing degrees. The power of the lower federal courts
is greater in the bureaucratic model than in the hierarchical model, though
in reality the power consists of typical bureaucratic recalcitrance and
20
incrementalism.
1
and Howard, 22
According to studies by Vines and Richardson,
however, neither of these models describes with complete accuracy the true
relationships between the various levels of the federal court system or the
roles which the courts of appeals and Supreme Court perform in that
system. Both of these studies conclude that the courts of appeals play a
more vital role in the formation of national law and that the federal court
system is not as tightly controlled by the Supreme Court as either model
assumes.
In an attempt to examine litigation flow within the federal judiciary
and particularly to analyze the functions of the courts of appeals, Howard
examined all non-consolidated cases, including administrative appeals,
decided by the District of Columbia (D.C.), Second, and Fifth Circuits from
1965 to 1967.23 Although all three circuit courts were asked to enforce
20K. VINES & R. RICHARDSON, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS 143-44 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as POLITICS OF FED. COURTS]. For a discussion of the bureaucratic model, see

Murphy,
Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. POL. Scr. REv. 1017 (1959).
21
POLITICS OF FED. COURTS, supra note 20, at 93.-161, passim.
2
2 Howard, Litigation Flow in Three United States Courts of Appeals, 8 LAw & Soc'Y.
REv. 33
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Litigation Flow].
23
These circuits handled about 40 percent of the total courts of appeals caseload during
this time period.
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federal law, particularly by the federal government, Howard noted a great
difference among the circuits as to the extent of use by various types of
litigants. The federal government, for example, was party to 70 percent of
the D.C. Circuit's cases, but only party to 51.7 percent of the Second
Circuit's cases and 48.5 percent of the Fifth Circuit's cases. State governments, while party to 14.4 percent of the Fifth Circuit's cases, were party to
only 8 percent of the Second Circuit's cases and 1 percent of the D.C.
Circuit's cases. Similarly, the percentage of cases in which both litigants
were private parties was 39.9 percent in the Second Circuit, 36.2 percent in
24
the Fifth Circuit, and 28.2 percent in the D.C. Circuit.
The circuits were also differentiated by the subject matter of their
caseloads: the Fifth Circuit had a heavy load of personal status cases; 25 the
Second Circuit had a large number of morals offenses cases; 26 and the D.C.
Circuit had the bulk of certain agencies' cases. 27 Such variations among the
circuits may well lead to regional specialization and to regionalized
national law. Thus, one must be wary of attempting to discuss the policy
28
role of the courts of appeals.
Turning to the flow of litigation within each of the three circuits,
Howard found that of the 12,406 district court trials completed during the
period, 48.7 percent were appealed, but only 30 percent received posthearing disposition. Of this latter group, 21.8 percent were reversed by the
courts of appeals. Cohesion within the circuits might be discerned from the
fact that the circuits heard less than one third of all district court decisions,
yet affirmed over 75 percent of this one third. If one also includes those
cases remanded for further consideration, the percentage of nonreversals
among cases heard by the circuits rose to 87.3 percent, thus portraying a
29
bottom-up view of decisionmaking within the federal judiciary.
Of the 4,941 cases disposed of by the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
after hearing or submission on briefs, 20.3 percent, a figure substantially
higher than the classical hunch of 10 percent, were appealed to the
Supreme Court.30 The Court granted the writ of certiorari in 1.9 percent of
the 4,941 decisions, which translates into nearly 10 percent of all cases
appealed. The Court then affirmed .5 percent and disturbed 1.4 percent of
the 1.9 percent. While one might argue that the number of cases reviewed
24

Litigation Flow, supra note 22, at 36-37.
Personal status cases constituted 23 percent of the Fifth Circuit's caseload. Litigation
Flow, 26supra
22, at 38-39.
Moralsnote
offenses (mostly narcotics) made up 9.4 percent of the Second Circuit's caseload.
25

Id.

27

For example, the FCC and other regulatory agencies. Other agencies such as the NLRB
or Immigration
and Naturalization Service were not so active in the D.C. Circuit. Id.
28
1d.
29
1d. at 41-42.
30
1d. at 42. In 1974, the percentage of such cases appealed from the circuits to the
Supreme Court reached 29.8 percent. Testimony of Judge Griffin B. Bell, HEARINGS BEFORE
THE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, SECOND PHASE, Vol.

II, 682 (1974-1975) [hereinafter cited as COMM.

ON REV., SECOND PHASE].
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was insufficient,31 the circuits were effectively the courts of last resort for
decisions, thus reemphasizing the bottom98.6 percent of the district court
2
up view of decisionmaking3
In their seminal study of the federal court system Vines and Richardson
examined five hypotheses which concerned Supreme Court interaction with
the lower federal courts and which were suggested by the hierarchical
model: 1) the Supreme Court will more often review cases that have been
reversed, rather than affirmed, at the appellate level; 2) the Court will more
readily hear and reverse decisions concerning interlevel conflict than
decisions concerning interlevel consensus; 3) the Supreme Court will more
often support the court of appeals in an interlevel conflict; 4) the Supreme
Court will hear more cases resulting from split panels than from
unanimous panels; and 5) the Supreme Court will reverse a divided
33
appellate court more frequently than a unanimous appellate court.
Using all of the Supreme Court's 1964-1965 docket with district court
and court of appeals antecedents, Vines and Richardson found none of
these hypotheses to be true. Fully 68 percent of the cases involved
agreement between the district court and the court of appeals. Of this 68
percent, 70 percent were reversed by the Supreme Court, thus injecting
conflict into the system and contradicting the first two hypotheses.
Contrary to the third hypothesis, the Supreme Court upheld the district
court in almost two thirds of the cases involving an interlevel conflict.
Contradicting the fourth hypothesis, the statistics demonstrated that only
23 percent of these cases were from split panels. Finally, Vines and
Richardson, rejecting the last hypothesis, found that while the Court
reversed 69 percent of these split panel decisions, it also reversed 68 percent
34
of the unanimous panel decisions.
In his study of litigation flow, Howard found that the Supreme Court
disturbed more appellate court affirmances (41) than reversals (16) and that
the Court reversed (21) more often than it affirmed (8) the circuit decision
in the event of interlevel conflict.3 5 Both of these results replicate the
findings of Vines and Richardson and suggest that the Supreme Court was
not reacting to lower court disagreement, whether intralevel or interlevel.
As Vines and Richardson stated:
In many respects, the court is best understood as a high court, similar to
the Court of Appeals in England. It functions as a kind of national council
of review which interacts with the lower courts, not as a systematic court
31
CompareHufstedler, Courtship and OtherLegal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545, 547 (1974) with,
Statement of Judge Henry J. Friendly, COMM. ON REv., SECOND PHASE, vol. I, supra note 30, at
209-10.
32Litigation Flow, supra note 2, at 42-46. This finding parallels that of PoLrICS OF FED.
CoURTs, supra note 20, at 114.
33

PoLrrcs OF FED. COURTs, supra note 20, at 151.

3

4d. at 151-56.
3 Litigation Flow, supra note 22. at 47-49.
5
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of appeals or as an adequate supervisor of the lower court system, but as a
policy formulator for selected issues. Its task is public policy formulation,
using lower court decisions as its medium. It selectively inspects and
responds to political tendencies in the lower courts, encouraging, modifying, and restricting the political patterns set in motion by litigation.
Thus, the lower courts and Supreme Court do "articulate a system," but
the system is less structured and rigid than either the hierarchical or
6
bureaucratic models suggested.
The Supreme Court therefore appears to be less interested in resolving
interlevel conflict than it is in settling policy disputes. Indeed, both of these

studies found that the Justices simply supported "whoever agreed with
them in whatever interested them in [the] appeals" before them.3 7 Because
'
its function "is to make law, not to correct error in its application," 38
the
Court must rely upon the courts of appeals to enforce the supremacy and
uniformity of the national law. The courts of appeals, however, due to the
Supreme Court's selective oversight, have the ability to create and to
balkanize national law.
Circuit judges filter issues on their way to the Supreme Court; they have
substantial opportunity to create and to resist judicial policy when the

Justices cannot or will not intervene, which is nearly all the time.3 9
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE

REFORMS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

In discussing the effect of the Judiciary Act of 1925,40 which granted the
Supreme Court extensive certiorari jurisdiction, Chief Justice Taft stated
that "the sound theory . . . is that litigants have their rights sufficiently
protected by a hearing or trial in the courts of first instance, and by one

review in an intermediate appellate court."'41 One must remember that the
courts of appeals, in addition to their lawmaking function, correct errors
made by the district courts. The caseload problem threatens both functions
of these intermediate appellate courts and can be remedied primarily by
making the review process more efficient and by adding more judges or
more circuits.
A.

Reforms to Improve Efficiency

Any reforms motivated by efficiency should include the appointment of
a circuit executive. Because some of the circuit chief judges, who are
supra note 20, at 161.
3 Litigation Flow, supra note 22, at 49. See also, POLITICS OF FED. COuRTS, supra note 20,
at 154, 156.
"Statement of Judge Friendly, COMM. ON REV., SECOND PHASE, supra note 30, at 210.
9
36PoLITICS OF FED. CouRTs,
7

3 Litigation Flow, supra note 22, at 46.
40
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
41
Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925).
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responsible for the circuits' internal administration, have neither the time
nor the skill required for such a task, Congress authorized, in 1970, the
judicial council of each circuit to appoint an executive to perform duties to
be delegated by that council. 42 Such duties might include monitoring day
to day operations of the court, making studies and recommendations
concerning the court's business, administering the district courts within the
circuit, acting as a liaison between groups within the circuit, and acting as
secretary of the circuit council.
By 1974 only the First and Seventh Circuits had not yet appointed a
circuit executive from those certified by the procedure specified in the 1970
statute. 43 The other circuits have assigned various duties to their executives
including acting as administrative assistants to the chief judges, assigning
'judges to three-judge district courts, reviewing claims for payment pursuant to' the Criminal Justice Act, and summarizing reports from and
drafting reports to the Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office, and
the Federal Judicial Center. Still other jobs include aiding the district
courts with various administrative problems, formulating case flow plans,
and helping to better train district court clerks. 44 Regardless of the specific
jobs given to these circuit executives, it seems obvious that they can aid in
the efficient operation of the courts of appeals.
Improved case docketing constitutes a second method of administrative
reform. Various circuits have undertaken reforms to shorten the time period
from notice of appeal to final disposition in order to recover a sizeable
portion of previously "lost time. '45 Many of these reforms have been46aimed
at shortening the time period in which the appeal is perfected.
The Second Circuit has led the circuits in docket reform with its
Criminal Justice Expediting Plan. 47 After finding in 1973 that an average of
178 days was required to process a criminal appeal from the notice of
appeal to final disposition, the circuit attempted to reduce the time span to
approximately 90 days. 48 In the first phase of the reform the court decreed
that trial counsel was required to remain as appellate counsel until relieved
4228 U.S.C. § 332 (1970). For a good study of the role of the circuit council, see P. FISH,
OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 379-426 (1973).
THE POLITICS
4

SMardneau, The Federal Circuit Executives: An Initial Report, 57 JUDICATURE 438-40
(1974).
441d. at 441, 444.
4SSee Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System, 54 JUDICATURE 237, 237-39
(1971) [hereinafter cited as More Efficient Fed. Appeals].
4"For example, in the Fifth Circuit in 1968, the median time interval from filing of
complete record to filing of last brief was 4.6 months, from filing of last brief to hearing or
submission on briefs was 2.7 months, and from hearing or submission on briefs to final
disposition was 1.5 months. Statement of Chief Judge John R. Brown, HEARINGs BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON REvISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,FIRST PHASE 157 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as COMM. ON REv., FIRST PHASE].
47Id. at 1140-42.
4rhe 1973 average for all of the circuits was 278 days. Stecich, Speeding Up Criminal
Appeals in the Second Circuit, 1 JUST. Sys. J. 43 (1975).
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by the appellate court. The circuit also created the position of scheduling
clerk, whose job was to set and to notify counsel of hearing dates. If the
appellant missed a scheduled hearing, the appeal was dismissed. A form
was also devised by which the trial judge could give the circuit certain basic
49
information such as the identity of parties and counsel.
The second phase of the reform was designed primarily to foster better
communication between the district court and the court of appeals. The
courtroom deputy was to give a convicted defendant's counsel instruction
sheets advising him how to proceed with the first steps of an appeal. The
same clerk was then to fill out the information sheet containing the basic
case information. The trial judge was to instruct counsel to order a
transcript quickly and to settle all payments with a clerk specifically
designated to send transcripts to the appellate court. Finally, the scheduling clerk of the court of appeals was to monitor and to insure the smooth
operation of the process. The program's results were impressive; about six
months after its initiation the Second Circuit's median time span was
50
shortened to 116 days.
Screening processes also have generally helped the courts of appeals
keep pace with their dockets. Unlike docketing reforms, however, screening
processes lead to an appeals process in which some cases receive different
treatment by the court.51 Screening processes are used to determine if a case
is suitable for preargument conference and whether a case merits full,
partial, or no oral argument prior to disposition.
The Second Circuit, with the aid of the Federal Judicial Center, has
pioneered the first type of screening process reform. The Civil Appeals
Management Plan for preargument conferences is an outgrowth of the
seldom used Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.z The
plan requires an appellant to file a preargument statement within ten days
of filing notice of appeal. The statement, which delineates the issues
involved, accompanies a form noting that the transcript has been ordered.
49

1d. at 44.
-Old. at 45-48. In the face of the heaviest caseload of any circuit, the Fifth Circuit, in the
late 1960's, began to implement docketing reforms. The median time interval for all cases
from the filing of the complete record to final disposition in cases heard or submitted on briefs
showed a precipitous drop from 8.8 months in 1968 to 4.9 months in 1973. Only the Second
Circuit, whose median time interval was 4.8 months, and the Eighth Circuit, with a median
interval of 4.5 months, had less lengthy intervals. Statement of Judge Irving R. Kaufman,
COMM. ON REV., FIRST PHASE, supra note 46, at 1039. It is interesting to note that 1973 was also
the year in which the Fifth Circuit screened the largest percentage of cases onto its summary
calendar. In 1974, when the percentage of cases placed on the summary calendar dropped, this
median time interval rose to 5.5 months. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE

51

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

374 (1974).

See generally Meador, Appellate Case Management and DecisionalProcesses,61 VA. L.
REV. 255 (1975).
52
As to Rule 33's neglect by the Second Circuit prior to this time, see M. SCHICK,
LEARNED HAND'S COURT 85-90 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LEARNED HAND'S COURT]; Note, The
Second Circuit: FederaljudicialAdministration in Microcosm, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 874, 885-86
(1963). Rule 33 of the FED. R. APP. P. parallels the pretrial conference rule of FED. R. Civ. P. 16.

1976]

FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

71

While the staff counsel and circuit executive would normally set a schedule
for docketing, filing of briefs, and hearing oral argument under the old
system, the staff counsel now determines whether the case is suitable for a
preargument conference.
The conference, held an average of 19.5 days after the filing of notice of
appeal, is conducted by the staff counsel so that a judge will not be forced
to disqualify himself from the trial if settlement is not reached.53 The staff
counsel may be viewed as a neutral and respected representative of the court
who can note the strengths and weaknesses of both parties' positions,
stabilize the bargaining process, suggest reasonable outcomes and settlements, and sharpen the issues for both the parties and the court. If such a
nonjudicial professional presides, not only will judicial time be saved, but
the conference judge will less likely be accused of bias. The parties will not
fear judicial retaliation if settlement is not reached, and one panel judge
will not have an advantage over his two colleagues by virtue of prior
familiarity with the case. 54 Though the staff counsel might not adequately
fulfill the role of an institutional substitute, the judge will benefit because
his time will not be spent in the preargument conference and because the
case, if settled, will not come before his panel.
Although it obviously is difficult to determine which cases are suitable
for preargument conferences, the Second Circuit scheduled 181 conferences
in the first four and one-half months of the plan. The results, though
inconclusive, were encouraging; while 27 cases were settled and seven were
withdrawn prior to conference, an identical number of cases were settled
and five were withdrawn after conference. Additionally, the conferences
55
simplified issues in 18 cases.
The second and most commonly used form of screening, that of
determining whether oral argument will be granted prior to disposition, is
carried out to differing extents by various methods in all circuits with the
exception of the Second Circuit. 56 For example, screening is used to decide
whether a case will receive full, limited, or no oral argument in the Sixth
Circuit;5 7 in the Tenth Circuit the chief judge screens the cases, puts the
unsubstantial appeals on a summary calendar, and places the quasisubstantial appeals on an accelerated docket for disposition with a
53
Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74
COLUM.
L. REv. 1094, 1094-98 (1974).
54
Mack, Settlement Proceduresin the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Proposal,I JusT. Sys. J.
17, 26-31 (1975).
55As 49 of the 66 cases concerned either personal injury, property damage, employment
disputes and contract disputes, it appears that the staff counsel were discerning in using
conferences more for monetary award cases than for injunction cases. Kaufman, The PreConference: An Appellate ProceduralReform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1098-1100.
Argument
56
Statement of Judge Kaufman, COMM. ON REv., FntsT PHASE, supranote 46, at 1033. But
see Statement of Judge Griffin B. Bell, id. at 470, in which Judge Bell noted that, instead of
limiting oral argument, the Second Circuit affirms from the bench about 30 percent of all
cases argued orally.
57More Efficient Fed. Appeals, supra note 45, at 239-40.

72
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shortened briefing schedule and limited oral argument.58 In the Fourth
Circuit the staff law clerk and his staff perform the screening process. After
reviewing 95 percent of all docketed cases, the staff, if it recommends that a
case not be granted oral argument, will forward the record to the panel, the
trial transcript, its recommendation, and a draft per curiam or memorandum opinion. Unpublished memorandum opinions are used in about
one half of all docketed pro se cases, while one third of the remaining
docketed cases are screened off the oral argument calendar. Thus, approximately 65 percent of the docketed cases do not receive oral argument in the
Fourth Circuit. 59 In 1973, 1,142 of the 1,504 cases which received judicial
action by the circuit were not orally argued. Of the 1,142 cases, only 145
were briefed. Other statistics seem to reinforce the notion that this type of
screening process is effective in separating the "important" from "unimportant" cases; 97 percent of the orally argued cases received published
opinions, while 84 percent of those cases that did not involve oral
60
argument received unpublished opinions.
In their study of the Fourth Circuit's screening process, Fl~nders and
Goldman found that when the judges' law clerks read the staff clerk's
recommendation prior to transmitting it to the judges these clerks usually
agreed with the recommendation. 61 Six of the seven judges were also
interviewed, and two of them estimated that recommendations to deny oral
argument were reversed in about 20 percent of the cases. Although Flanders
and Goldman concluded that in the majority of instances the staff clerks
mirrored the views of the judges, 62 it is tempting to query whether the
reverse is more true and whether the judges have abdicated part of their
63
judicial function through this screening process.
Faced with the heaviest caseload of any circuit, the Fifth Circuit has
also been quite successful in implementing the screening procedures set
5
d. at 240. See also Note, Screening of CriminalCases in the FederalCourts of Appeals:
Practice and Proposals, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 77 (1973).
59
Flanders &eGoldman, Screening Practicesand the Use of Para-JudicialPersonnel in a
U.S. Court of Appeals: A Study in the Fourth Circuit, 1 Just. Sys. J. 1, 3-6 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Screening Practices].But see Statement of Chief Judge Brown, COMM. ON REV., FntSr
PHASE, supra note 46, at 638, in which he noted that the Fourth Circuit's caseload statistics are
somewhat inflated because every prisoner's letter directed to the court is counted as a case filed.
This does not, however, negate the finding by Flanders and Goldman that a large percentage
of the6 0circuit's cases do not receive oral argument.
Screening Practices,supra note 59, at 7. There was little relation between having or not
having oral argument and affirmation or reversal by the court.
61
id. at 9-10.
62Id. at 10.
61
3 d. at 9-10. Another potential problem presented by this screening process is that
while a permanent staff law clerk would add expertise to the process, his recommendations
might be too readily accepted by the judges. See Testimony of Chief Judge David T. Lewis,
COMM. ON REV., SECOND PHASE, vol. II, supra note 30, at 977, in which he noted that,
although the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to experiment with screening by a central
staff, the program has been cut back because the judges found it "too easy to lean" on the
central staff.
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forth in its Local Rule 18.64 Approximately 60 percent of the filed cases,
selected due to their subject matter, are screened by staff attorneys, and the
other 40 percent are screened by panels of judges. If a staff attorney decides
that a case ought to be argued orally he places it on a tentative calendar and
sends it to the panel's presiding judge, who determines whether the case
was correctly classified. If he disagrees with the staff attorney the presiding
judge then reclassifies the case and sends it to the regular screening panel.
In order to deny oral argument in the case, the three judges of the screening
65
panel must agree on both the screening class and the final opinion.
Screened cases are placed in one of four classes: Class I consists of
frivolous cases; Class II consists of cases which do not merit oral argument;
Class III consists of cases which are granted limited oral argument; and
Class IV consists of cases which are granted full oral argument.6 6 In 1972,
59.1 percent of the circuit's caseload were placed on the summary calendar
(Classes I and II) and thus did not receive oral argument. It appears,
however, that the circuit decided fewer cases without oral argument in 1973
(57 percent) and in 1974 (54.9 percent).67 Although these innovations might
well have permanent value 68 and although every case is screened only in
order to determine "how the case should be given full appellate review on
the merits,"69 figures such as those cited above might prompt one to
wonder whether the Fifth Circuit has granted too much freedom to mass
production methods intended to control its burgeoning docket.
Indeed, no matter how the screening process is accomplished the
quality and integrity of the appellate judicial process may be jeopardized
by excessive resort to such expedient means as denial or oral argument. A
survey of lawyers filing cases in the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits
clearly revealed a lack of desire to yield the quality of the appellate process
to efficiency. They asserted that oral argument should only be denied in a
frivolous appeal, not for avoidance of extreme delay. 70 Also, in those
circuits in which lawyers must travel great distances to the court of appeals,
6"Statement of Chief Judge Brown, COMM. ON REV., FIRST PHASE, supra note 46, at 51012, 544.

65
Testimony of Chief Judge John R. Brown, COMM. ON REV., SECOND PHASE, VOL. II,
supra note 30, at 870-71. See also COMM. ON REv., FiRsr PHASE, supra note 46, at 145, in which
he described the now unused standing panel method of screening.
6"Statement of Chief Judge Brown, COMM. ON REV., FIRST PHASE, supra note 46, at 145.
67Statement of Chief Judge Brown, COMM. ON REV., SECOND PHASE, supra note 30, at 883.
A further breakdown of the circuit's disposition of its 1973 caseload revealed that fully 44.2
percent of the cases placed on the summary calendar received a Rule 21 affirmance which did
not contain any explanatory citation. Statement of Chief Judge Brown, COMM. ON REv., FiRsT
PHASE, supra note 46, at 274. See note 81 infra & text accompanying.
68Statement of Chief Judge Brown, COMM. ON REv., FiRsT PHASE, supra note 46, at 53336.
69d. at 510.
7

°COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND

INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 42-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
COMM.

ON REv., RECOMMENDATIONS].
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counsel frowned upon the early stoppage of oral argument.7' Taking into
account the concern of the bar, the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System has recommended that oral argument be a matter
of right in civil and criminal appeals unless "a) the appeal is frivolous; b)
the dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively
decided; or c) the facts are simple, the determination of the appeal rests on
the application of settled rules of law, and no useful purpose could be
served by oral argument." 72 The Commission did recommend, however,
that oral argument be "shortened in cases in which the dispositive points
can be adequately presented in less than the usual time allowable."" s
Little more can or should be done to speed up the decisionmaking
process within the courts of appeals. Though it is true that in 1969 the
Fifth Circuit adopted a local rule ordering the rendition of an opinion
within 90 days after the case is readied for disposition (e.g., after oral
argument), such a rule really has more effect upon the opinion writing
stage than upon the actual decisionmaking stage.7 4 Most circuits use the
conference system, in which pending cases are discussed at a weekly
meeting. The Second Circuit, however, has for years used a memorandum
system in which each member of the panel is expected to write an
explanatory memorandum for each case prior to conferring with his
brethren.75 While collegial discussion at a weekly conference certainly
requires less time than writing, circulating, and reading other judges'
memoranda prior to conference, the members of the Second Circuit believe
that their system forces each judge to study each case, promotes conference
resolution, and prevents one-judge opinions.7 6
Retention of these decisionmaking processes does not, however, preclude changing the form of the resultant opinions and the manner of their
assignment among panel members. The signed opinion, even in cases
decided after oral argument or submission upon briefs, is no longer the
norm in the courts of appeals. In 1963, one observer noted that approximately one-quarter of the Second Circuit's opinions annually were
memorandum opinions. 77 Furthermore, this circuit has for years rendered
71Id. at 43.
72Id. at 48.
7SId.
74
More Effective Fed. Appeals, supra note 45, at 239. One 'might argue that the opinion
writing stage is an integral part of the decisionmaking process because a judge may change his
vote at any point prior to announcement of the decision. It is my impression, however, that in
many circuits much less vote switching occurs during the opinion writing stage than occurs
during the same stage in the Supreme Court.
75LEARNED HAND'S COURT, supra note 52, at 96-102; Note, The Second Circuit: Federal
JudicialAdministration in Microcosm, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 874, 891-95 (1963).
76See note 75 supra.
77Note, The Second Circuit: FederalJudicial Administration in Microcosm, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 874, 895, n.206 (1963).
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oral decisions shortly after the completion of oral argument. 78 In the Third
Circuit, only 30 percent of the cases heard orally or submitted on briefs in
1973 received signed opinions. 79 In addition to using a great number of per
curiam opinions, Fifth Circuit judges may deliver an affirming opinion
which simply states "Affirmed [Enforced]. See Local Rvle 21."80 Such an
opinion may be used if: 1) the district court judgment based on findings of
fact is not clearly erroneous; 2) the evidence to support the jury verdict is
not insufficient; 3) the order of the administrative agency is supported by
substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole; or 4) no error of law
appears and an opinion would not have precedential value. 8'
Opinion writing clearly takes a large part of a judge's time. A 19711973 Time Study of the Third Circuit found that the judges spent 48.2
percent of their working time on writing and clearing opinions.8 2 Another
study, which noted that the use of signed opinions by all circuits rose 32
percent and that the use of per curiam opinions rose over 100 percent from
1966-1970, also found a strong relationship between pressure on a circuit
(measured by caseload) and the use of per curiam opinions.83 Of course,
selective publication could possibly relieve some of the pressure concerning
the need for exact phraseology in opinions, might enable a court to more
quickly dispose of its docket, and also might lower the number of opinions
which the judges must digest. An excessive decrease in the number of
explanatory opinions might, however, damage both the circuits' lawmaking and trial court review functions. Problems concerning the precedential value of unpublished opinions might also arise, although they
probably could be resolved through standards set forth by the circuits.84
The Commission on Revision, however, has recommended that every
opinion, including per curiam or informal memorandum opinions issued
only to the litigants, should contain some explanation, even if only an
appropriate citation.8 5
The opinion writing stage can also be made more efficient by assigning
opinions to judges who, prior to donning their robes, specialized in certain
79LEARNED HAND'S COURT, supra note 52, at 93-94; COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 70, at 43; Statement of Judge Bell, COMM. ON REV., FiRST PHASE, supra note 46, at
470. In all, five circuits allow decisions without written opinion. Haworth, Screening and
Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 271.
79COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 41.
801More Efficient Fed. Appeals, supra note 45, at 243-44,
8 1d
82 COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 49.
8
Atkins, Opinion Assignments on the U.S. Court of Appeals: The Question of Issue
Specialization, 27 W. POL. Q. 409, 411-12 [hereinafter cited as Opinion Assignments]. Using
the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r2), which describes the percentage of the
dependent variable's variance explainable by the independent variable, Atkins found that 67
percent (rz=.67) of the variance in the use of per curiam opinions was due to the pressure on
the circuit.
84
See Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61
A.B.A.J.
1224 (1975).
85
COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note 70, at 50-51.
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doctrinal areas. In his study of this issue, Atkins found not only
specialization in some circuits but also a broad range in the nature and
quantity of the specialities.8 6 Surprisingly, despite some degree of specialization in most circuits, the opinion writing ratio, defined as the ratio of
opinions written to the number of cases in which the judge was in the
majority, was fairly constant within each circuit. Thus, most judges shared
87
the circuit opinion load equally.
Although specialization can lead to expedition of cases and to increased
legitimacy due to developed internal expertise, the practice should nevertheless be discouraged because it might lead to one-judge decisions if
deference is given to the panel expert. One of the most important features
of the courts of appeals is the collegial nature of decisionmaking. Though
informal opinion assignments based upon expertise inevitably occur,
opinion specialization should be carefully scrutinized before being institutionalized as a permanent reform. In order to continue performing their
vital roles in forming national law and in effectively acting as courts of last
resort for cases originating in the district courts, the courts of appeals
should consist of generalists who will judge each case that comes before
them, rather than specialists whose truncated knowledge of the law will
deter their competent participation in each case.
B. Adding Judges or Circuits
The above procedural reforms, even if desirable, will have obviously
limited effects on the efficiency of the courts of appeals if caseloads
continue to grow. Once this limit is reached, adding judges and reshaping
the circuits will be the only available reforms.
There are several methods of adding judges to the circuits without
adding judgeships. The simplest method is to fill all available judgeships.
Although there were 97 authorized judgeships in 1975, there were actually
only 96 active judges serving the circuits. Despite the acknowledged
political nature of the appointment process, 88 appointments must be made
as quickly as possible in order to keep these courts fully staffed. Some
86
See Opinion Assignments, supra note 83, at 413-22. For example, in the Second
Circuit, Judge Hays, who was a leading expert in labor law prior to his appointment,
specialized in labor cases coming before panels on which he served, but he wrote relatively few
opinions concerning criminal-constitutional law. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Knock
specialized in personal injury and contract cases, but wrote few tax opinions. Conversely,
Judge Schrakenberg specialized in tax cases, but wrote almost no personal injury opinions. In
the Fourth Circuit, Chief Judge Sobeloff specialized in multiple areas, while no other judge
specialized in any single area. This study, however, only examined specialization manifested
by written opinions and did not attempt to discern the existeice of latent specialization, in
which another judge directs the discussion and knows the relevant law, but for some reason
does not
write the opinion.
871d. at 416-24. This piece's findings should be used temperately due to some serious
methodological problems built into the research design. One such problem was the failure to
compare his findings using Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) with findings that would
result from a random assignment of opinions among panel members.
88S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 8-16 (1st ed.,
1971).
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circuits have suffered heavily due to appointment gaps. For example, in
1970-1975 the Second Circuit lost 48 judgeship months, and the Third
Circuit lost 78 judgeship months.8 9
By virtue of congressional authorization, the circuits may also use
district judges and senior judges from either within or without the circuit.90
Such use is not, however, devoid of problems. In order to use a visiting
judge, the chief judge of the visitor's circuit must give his approval.
Because most district courts and courts of appeals are overworked, such
approval is not likely to be forthcoming. If he can spare a district judge,
the chief judge would likely use him in his own circuit. If such a visit is
approved or if the circuit looks to its own personnel, problems still arise
because these additional judges may not be very familiar with circuit law
and may add to intracircuit conflict. Moreover, the district judges sitting on
a circuit might be uncomfortable reviewing the actions of their district
court colleagues. Finally, district court judges might not be accustomed to
the different procedures and nuances inherent in collegial appellate courts.
Senior judges are technically eligible for retirement, but many of them
continue to sit for years after gaining such status.91 The Commission on
Revision, however, has noted that the circuits definitely should not rely on
these judges. Instead, these judges should be considered as a bonus and
Congress should make it easier to attain senior judge status. 92 More active
judgeships would then be opened for new appointments. These new
appointees, when added to the senior judges (the number of whom is not
limited by Congress), might help relieve the crowded dockets and might
help retain the judicial wisdom of the older, more experienced judges.
Even with complete utilization of these reforms, additional judgeships
will still be required due to mounting caseloads. While these additions will
enable the circuits to handle more cases, they will create other serious
problems. Given the dynamics of collegial courts, the addition of judges
means increased opportunity for intracircuit conflict within panels, between
panels, and in en banc proceedings. Noting these potential problems in
1964, the Judicial Conference's Special Committee on Geographical
Organization of Courts stated that the maximum feasible number of active
89COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 63.
9028 U.S.C., §§ 292(a), 295 (1970).
91
1n 1975 senior judges participated in 10.8 percent of the cases submitted on briefs or
orally argued to the circuits. Indeed, senior judges participated in 30.3 percent of such cases in
the Second Circuit in 1975. Together, senior and visiting judges participated in 22.6 percent of
the cases submitted on briefs or orally argued to the circuits. A.O. ANN. REP. (1975), supra note
9, at 186.
2
9 COMM. ON REv., RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 64-65. At the present time a
judge may become a senior judge if he is 65 years old, with 15 years of service on the bench, or
if he is 70 years old, with 10 years on the bench. The Commission proposed a "rule of 80"
with 60 years old and 20 years of service, or 70 years old and 10 years of service as the rule's
parameters. This would insure a minimum age of 60 years and a minimum length of service
of 10 years.
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circuit judges in a circuit was nine, the highest number of active judges
then serving in any single circuit.93
It appears, however, that each judge can competently dispose of only a
finite number of cases in a term and that nine active judges might simply
be incapable of staying abreast of mounting caseloads.9 4 Thus, since 1969
the Fifth Circuit has operated with 15 active judges, and the Ninth Circuit
has operated with 13 active judges. 95 Although no statistics have yet been
gathered for all of the circuits, a rise in the number of active judges clearly
adds to the potential for intracircuit conflict and might well necessitate en
banc proceedings in order to settle the circuit law.
Sanctioned first by the Supreme Court 96 and then authorized by
Congress, 9 7 en banc proceedings have rarely been used by the circuits to
achieve internal uniformity. 98 In 1975, only .8 percent of all cases decided
by the circuits after oral argument or submission on briefs were heard en
banc. 99
Though predicated upon the belief that the attentionof the full court of
active judges 00 leads to more competent decisions, promotes harmonious
institutional functioning, and adds the authority of the full court to
decisions, 10 1 there is a point at which the presence of too many judges turns
a hearing into a convention. In addition to the time lost by requiring all of
the active judges to sit in a single hearing, en bancs of 13 or 15 judges
might well be too large for effective resolution of intracircuit conflict. As
Fifth Circuit Judge Godbold stated to the Commission on Revision:
Also there seems to me to arise what one might call the silencing effect of a
deliberative body's becoming too large. By this I mean the risk, particularly in en banc multi-issue cases, that the individual judge may conclude
that there are so many viewpoints to be heard and considered on so many
questions that he will not press and perhaps not even express his own
views. Or if he presses them they may be lost or obscured in the shuffle. 0 2
93Burdick, FederalCourts of Appeals: Radical Surgery or Conservative Care, 60 Ky. L.J.
807, 808-09
(1972).
94
Compare Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in JudicialAdministration,
42 TEX. L. REV. 949, 956-57 (1964) and Mishkin, A Footnote to A "Crisis in Judicial
Administration,'"42 TEx. L. REV. 1049 (1964) with Statement of Judge Brown, COMM. ON
REV., FIRST PHASE, supra note 46, at 507-32.
5

9 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS 97 (1970).

""Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953); Textile Mills
Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
9728 U.S.C., § 46(c) (1970).
""The Second Circuit did not use them until after Learned Hand, who vehemently
opposed their use, became Senior Judge. LEARNED HAND'S COURT, supra note 52, at 115-22.
99A.O. ANN. REP. (1975), supra note 9, at 182.
"'"A senior judge may sit on the en banc only if he sat on the original panel. 28 U.S.C. §
46(c) (1970).
""1See Alexander, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating
InstitutionalResponsibilities,Part1,40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 563, 579-89, 726 (1964); Note, En Banc
Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1637, 1648-51 (1974).
"°2Statement of Judge John C. Godbold, COMM. ON REV., FIRST PHASE, supra note 46, at
*77
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Furthermore, the use of an en banc proceeding does not guarantee an
authoritative circuit decision: the en banc may be closely divided or evenly
103
split, and all future panels of the circuit may not adhere to the decision.
Noting that the inevitable increase in the number of active judges will
probably lead to more en banc proceedings, the Commission on Revision
has recommended a different en banc structure for circuits in which nine
active judges constitute a majority of the circuit's active majority. The
Commission recommended that the panel judges be ineligible to sit on the
en banc and that the en banc court consist of the chief judge and the eight
most senior active judges. 104 This proposal is not without faults, however.
First, by making the panel judges ineligible to sit on the en banc, the en
banc, in effect, becomes an appeal from the panel decision, when in reality it
should be a reconsideration of the panel decision. Second, by restricting
the membership on the en banc to the active judges, the proposal simply
disregards the experience and wisdom which senior judges might well
bring to the proceeding. Finally, the possibility exists that those judges
who do not sit on the en banc will feel less compelled to comply with
its decision than if they had taken part in the proceeding.
A possible response to the problems caused by endlessly adding judges
would be to decide that the courts of appeals, as well as the Supreme Court,
should not attempt to perform both corrective and policymaking roles.
Judge Hufstedler has proposed that a National Court of Review be placed
between the district court and the court of appeals. 10 After a trial in the
district court the aggrieved party could petition for review: this petition
would preclude all other post judgment motions in the district court. The
review panel, consisting of the district judge and two members of the Court
of Review, would review all portions of the trial. After receiving the court's
decision, an aggrieved party could appeal to the court of appeals, but the
appellate tribunal would now have discretion to deny or to grant review. 06
Though this plan might expedite appeals, an intermediate appellate
tribunal cannot totally divorce its corrective and policymaking functions.
One might also doubt the trial judge's ability to effectively and objectively
review his own previous actions.
The need to limit the number of judges who may effectively work on a
collegial court may require the reorganization of the judges who presently
sit on the courts of appeals. Rosenberg and Carrington suggest consolidating all of the present circuits and then dividing the judges into divisions
based upon subject matter. 10 7 Such subject matter divisions might deal with
criminal appeals, certain national law specialties to be designated by
103Note, En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A Reassessment, 72 MicH. L. REV.
1637, 1646 (1974).
04

1 COMM. ON REV., REcOMMENDATIONS,
10

supra note 70, at 60-63.

Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids:Reshaping the JudicialSystem, 44 S. CAL.
L. REv. 901, 910-11 (1971).
06

1 1d.
107

PlannedFlexibility,supra note 1, at 589-96; Crowded Dockets, supra note 5, at 587-96.
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Congress, customs and patents, and claims against the federal government. 08 Although each division would only deal with its subject matter,
the judges could be rotated among the divisions in order to retain
decisionmaking by generalists. Carrington has admitted, however, that this
model will not meet the major problem of intercircuit conflicts. 09
Balkanization of the federal law and forum shopping among division
panels located in geographically disparate areas might still occur. Furthermore, given the geographical spread of the divisions, administrative
discretion would be increased and might well lead to administrative
inefficiency.1 0
Splitting the present circuits appears to be the most extreme response to
the problems caused by the additional judges. Since the circuits were
created in 1891, only the Eighth Circuit has been split."' Though circuit
splitting might resolve some of the problems caused by the additional
judges, it may increase other problems such as intercircuit conflicts." 2 The
problem of intercircuit conflicts might be substantially reduced if the
Supreme Court viewed the settlement of such conflicts as its major
function. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court perceives the
settlement of intercircuit conflicts as only one of its several functions, not
as its major function." 3
Another problem is that further splitting of circuits inevitably leads to
a weakening of the "federalizing function"" 4 of the courts of appeals. The
Commission on Revision recognized this problem when it formulated
proposed splits of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in 1973."1 The Commission
attempted to adhere to five principles in its proposals: 1) a circuit should
consist of at least three states; 2) no circuit should be created which would
initially require more than nine active judges; 3) a circuit's states should have
diverse populations, legal business, and socio-economic interests; 4) present
circuits should be changed as little as possible; and 5) new circuits should
6
not contain non-contiguous states."
The problem of reduced regionalism is exemplified by the proposed
split of the Ninth Circuit which, in 1973, had a caseload of 178 cases per
judge, in contrast to the national average of 161 cases per judge.
' 08Additionally, Rosenberg's plan would include divisions to aid the Supreme Court in
both screening and deciding cases. Planned Flexibility, supra note 1" at 594.
' 09Crowded Dockets, supra note 5, at 596.
"Old. at 596-604.
"'The
Eighth Circuit was split in 1929 into the present Eighth and Tenth Circuits.
112
Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit:A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L.
REV. 949, 970-75 (1964).
'"See, section I supra and section III infra.
'4Statement of Judge John M. Wisdom, COMM. ON REV., FIRST PHASE, supra note 46, at
354.
115COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE GEOGRAPH-

ICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS (1973) [hereinafter cited
as COMM. ON REV., GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES].
6
1d. at 6-7.
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Consequently, the circuit was required to rely heavily on visiting judges.
The proposed plan would create a new Ninth Circuit consisting of
California-Northern, California-Eastern, Alaska, Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, Montana, Hawaii, and Guam. A new Twelfth Circuit would consist
of California-Southern, California-Central, Arizona, and Nevada. Despite
some advantages, the splitting of California might engender both an
extreme amount of forum shopping and multiple interpretations of that
state's law."a7 Similarly, one major objection to several of the proposed
splits of the Fifth Circuit is that those judges recalcitrant on civil fights
issues might be separated from their more liberal brethren of other states of
the present circuit." 8
III.

CASELOAD GROWTH, THE SCREENING PROCESS, AND REFORM PROPOSALS
CONCERNING THE SUPREME COURT

Prior to any discussion concerning either the Supreme Court's problems or solutions to those problems, one must answer the fundamental
question - what role does the Supreme Court perform? Kurland has
suggested that as an appellate court its role is to correct erroneous decisions
made by lower courts, to maintain consistency among decisions of the
lower courts, and to make national law and policy.11 9 Kurland further

suggested that the Supreme Court acts predominantly as a selective
policymaker.120 In order to ascertain what functions the Court fulfills one
must examine the Court's screening process and the growth of its caseload.
The result of this examination will perforce affect later discussion of
various reform proposals concerning the Court.
A.

Caseload Growth and the Screening Process

With the exception of the addition of one law clerk for each Justice, no
substantial change affecting the Supreme Court's capacity to deal with its
increasing caseload has been made since 1925. While the 1925 Judiciary Act
greatly increased the Court's ability to choose what cases it would hear,
observers of the Act's short term consequences noted that shifting cases
from the Court's obligatory to discretionary jurisdiction would not solve a
long term caseload problem.' 2 ' Even recent proponents of the total.
"'Id. at 12-19. But see Statement of Erwin N. Griswold, COMM. ON REV., FxRsr PHASE,
supra18note 46, at 27.
1Letter of Senior Judge Rives, Hearings on S. 729 Before the Subcommittee.on
Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Committeeon the Judiciay,94th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 2, 209-10 (1975).
" 9Kurland, Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REv.
616, 618-19 (1974).
1201d.
"'Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 34143 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court's Caseload]. After correcting the statistics used by
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elimination of the Court's obligatory jurisdiction recognize that such a
reform will not solve the purported Supreme Court caseload problem. 22
The majority of such students of the Court claim that its caseload
problem can be easily discerned by simply examining various statistics,
while those on the other side of the argument dismiss any relation between
such statistics and a caseload problem. For example, Harper examined
all denied certiorari petitions on the Court's Appellate Docket for the 19491952 Terms. After examining the opinions of the courts below, he decided
that the Court had denied many petitions worthy of certiorari. 23
Hart, on the other hand, attempted to demonstrate that the need to
screen a burgeoning caseload left the Justices little time for actual
decisionmaking t 24 Hart stated that his results clearly demonstrated the
extent to which the Justices were both overworked and forced to rely on
their law clerks in the screening process. 25 More importantly, he believed
that this caseload problem inevitably affected the quality of the decisions.'
Thus, he suggested that the Court accept fewer cases and better explain its
26
decisions.
Justice Douglas, among others, 27 retorted that Hart's overworked
Supreme Court was a myth. He noted that the Justices now heard oral
argument on only four days, rather than five days a week, as had been the
practice. Additionally, while there was a decline of approximately 53
percent in the number of written opinions over the 1938-1958 time span,
there was an increase of 200 percent in the number of per curiam opinions
issued by the Court. Furthermore, as filings increased 200 percent from
1938 to 1958, much of the increase consisted of in forma pauperis petitions.
Justice Douglas noted that the majority of these petitions was frivolous
Frankfurter and Landis in their studies of the Act's effects upon the Court in its 1928-1930
Terms, Casper and Posner found that 39 percent of the cases filed in 1923 were within the
Court's obligatory jurisdiction, while only 15 percent of cases filed in the 1930 Term were
within such jurisdiction. Id.
122Cf. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE

25-38 (1972) (hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT].
"'Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 293 (1950); Harper & Etherington, What the
Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1951); Harper &
Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 439
(1953); Harper & Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 427 (1954). See also Statement of Griswold, COMM. ON REv., FIRST PHASE, supra
note 246,
at 15.
1 4Assuming that the Court sat for 36 weeks and that the Justices worked six, eight-hour
days each week, Hart constructed the following breakdown for each Justice: 242 hours for
initial review of 1,400 certiorari petitions and appeals, 240 hours for oral argument of 125
cases, 132 hours for 24 conferences with their brethren, 250 hours for studying the briefs and
records of the 125 cases, 528 hours for writing an average of 22 opinions, 140 hours for
studying the 176 opinions of colleagues, and 196 hours for miscellaneous judicial work. Hart,
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justice, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 85-93 (1959).
121d. at 95.
126Id. at 96-101.
127See, e.g., Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960).
SUPREME COURT
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and thus required little review by the Justices. 2 8 Several years later,
Gressman echoed this sentiment, claiming that statistics concerning the
mounting caseload were not indicative of an overload problem.1 29 Gressman concluded that the constancy of the number of written opinions and
certiorari petitions granted is the product of the Court's judgment of what
constitutes an efficient workload. 30
Despite these arguments, the Freund Report relied upon statistical data
to produce an obvious shock effect.' 3' The report noted that while the
Court has stayed abreast of filings it has developed an increasing backlog of
holdover cases. The in forma pauperis cases filed on the Miscellaneous
Docket have increased from 517 in 1951, to 1,930 in 1971, and now constitute
more than one half of all filings. 3 2 The percentage of certiorari petitions
granted dropped from 11.1 percent in 1951 to 5.8 percent in 1971.1 3 3 Noting

that the law clerks are now used to help screen cases and that the Justices
have less time available for reviewing docketed cases, the study group
concluded that cases that would have been decided on the merits a
generation ago now are being passed over and that consideration given to
cases decided on the merits is compromised by the pressures of "pro34
cessing" an inflated docket.
Such statistics, however, hardly indicate the nature of the growth of the
Court's docket. In their attempt to explain the qualitative as well as the
quantitative change in the Court's docket, Casper and Posner posited five
hypotheses:
First ....

[o]ther things being equal . . . an increase over time in the

volume of an activity should give rise to an increase in the number of legal
disputes . . . arising from the activity. Second, the number of litigated

disputes is expected to vary inversely with the certainty (predictability) of
the law. .

.

. Third, the creation of new or expansion of existing

substantive legal rights should produce an increase in the number of
cases.... Fourth, the availability or cost of legal services may change over
" 8 Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Caseload, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 404-11 (1960).
For a description of the speedy manner in which Justice Douglas reviewed certiorari petitions,
see Cohen, Justice Douglas: A Law Clerk's View, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1959).
129He noted that Chief Justice Hughes stated that 60 percent of the Court's Appellate
Docket cases were wholly-without merit and that Justice Harlan estimated that more than one
half of the certiorari petitions filed in the 1955-1957 Terms were unwarranted. Echoing Justice
Douglas, Gressman stated that the greatest case increase in the 1952-1962 period consisted of in
forma pauperis cases (up 1,064), not of Appellate Docket cases (up 319), and that most of the

former cases were frivolous. Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari,52 GEO. L.J. 742, 745-46
(1962).
13Id. at 753.
"'It reported that case filings had swollen from 983 in 1935, to 1,234 in 1951, to 2,185 in

1961, and, finally, to 3,643 in 1971.

FREUND REPORT,

supra note 122, at 2.

"'During the same 1951-1971 period the amount of non-in forma pauperis case filings
rose about 250 percent. Id. at 2-B.
"'Both the in forma pauperis and paid cases reflected this decline, with 3.3 percent of the
former and 8.9 percent of the latter accepted by the Court. Id. at 3-9.
4
i at 4-8.
1d.
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time and.., affect the number of cases brought....
Fifth, we may expect
135
secular caseload changes to be self-limiting.

Using these hypotheses in response to both the Warren Court's decisions
and the increased availability of legal services, Casper and Posner suggested
that the Supreme Court's constitutional and criminal dockets should show
faster growth than its nonconstitutional and civil dockets. Nonetheless,
they hypothesized that the rate of increase of the Court's docket would
36
show a decline.
The examination of the Court's Appellate Docket for the 1957-1972
Terms by Casper and Posner indeed showed uneven growth. Since the
1957-1958 Terms, the constitutional docket grew 214 percent while the
nonconstitutional docket grew only 32 percent. The criminal docket
increased more than the civil docket. 3 7 In addition, much of the increase
in the civil docket was attributable to doctrinal developments. For example,
civil rights and reapportionment cases accounted for a large percentage of
the total increase in civil cases from 1957 to 1972.111
Casper and Posner posited that those areas of nongrowth or decline,
such as taxation and FELA suits, might result from an essentially settled
state of the law in these areas. 139 Nevertheless, the docket of nonconstitutional cases continued to increase. 40 Thus the hypothesis stating that
appeals from marginally important cases would be self limiting might not
be valid.' 4' Overall filing rates, though, tended to support the broader
hypothesis that fewer cases will be filed as the Court's caseload increases
142
and as the percentage of certiorari petitions granted declines.
Casper and Posner stated that if the average merit of filed cases has
increased, then so has the merit threshold required to receive the writ of
certiorari. 43 The deterrence of marginal cases by not granting the writ also
means that the remaining pool will be more meritorious. Indeed, if the
135Supreme Court's Caseload, supra note 121, at 346-48. See also Litigation in the Federal
Courts, supra note 7, at 321-26.
1376Supreme Court's Caseload, supra note 121.
1SExact percentages could not be calculated due to the absence of the Miscellaneous
Docket figures. Id. at 352.
181d. at 357-60. State criminal cases on the Appellate Docket increased 324 percent due to
the declaration of novel rights by the Warren Court. Federal criminal cases increased 219
percent because of a better legal environment, greater availability of legal services, and more
congenial habeas corpus rulings by the Court. Id.
139 d. at 354-57.
14Id. at 349.
' 4 10ne might posit, for example, that a lawyer might appeal a marginally important case
only in
order to prove to his client that he has done everything possible to win the case.
142Supreme Court's Caseload, supra note 121, at 361-62. The increases are based upon the
filing differential between the first and fifth years of each time period. Also, it should be noted
that even if the case filing should level off in accordance with the self-limitation thesis, the
Court still could not possibly review enough cases to fulfill the three roles outlined above.
Using five year periods, Casper and Posner found a 45 percent increase in filings for 19571962, a 31 percent increase for 1962-1967, and only a 21 percent increase for 1967-1972.
'131d. at 365-66.
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percentage of cases accepted for review had not declined, then the number
of filings would have increased even more than it did.144 By assuming a
change in the merit threshold it appears that the Justices use the screening.
process to further their policy objectives and that the Justices do not feel
bound to review any fixed class of cases.
The Commission on Revision has made detailed studies in order to
determine whether, and to what extent, the second assumption was valid
for the Court's docket. The Commission's report clearly stated that the
45
Court does not satisfactorily stabilize and harmonize national law.
Examining the certiorari petitions denied and appeals summarily disposed
of in the 1971-1972 Terms, the Commission found 93 unresolved clear
conflicts. Partially confirming Casper and Posner's data regarding constitutional conflicts, the Commission found that while almost one half of the
constitutional conflicts were reviewed, only one fifth of the nonconstitutional conflicts were reviewed.1 46 Finally, the Commission found a 225
percent increase in the number of dissents from denials of certiorari since
1969, thus confirming the thesis that the merit threshold has risen. 4 7 While
Justice White informed the Commission that some of the cases which
receive summary disposition warrant plenary disposition, 148 Justice Rehnquist's letter to the Commission even more specifically designated intercircuit conflicts as the area in which Supreme Court supervision is most
49
inadequate.
The findings of these two studies adequately demonstrate that the
Court primarily plays the role of selective policymaker. Examining only
statistics may cause observers to look at the wrong illness. As Griswold has
stated, the Supreme Court may not be overworked because it controls its
own docket. 150 The inevitable effect of such self-control is to ration justice
to an extent greater than was contemplated by the framers of the 1925 Act.
Cases deemed worthy of certiorari 20 years ago now do not receive plenary
disposition. Griswold has admitted that as Solicitor General he refused to
appeal certain cases to the Court simply because he knew that it was too
busy to review them.' 5' Thus even the Solicitor General, the single most
44Id. at 366-68.
145COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 8.
146Id. ,at 104-05. See also id. at 5-8, 91-111.
1471d. at 19-21, 111-33. Though the bulk of this increase is due to Justice Douglas, the
Commission believed that the reasons stated in 60 percent of the dissents clearly demonstrated
that certain types of litigation were not being reviewed by the Court: statutory questions
appropriate for definitive resolution; conflict with Supreme Court decisions; important
national questions ripe for resolution; and conflict among the lower federal courts. It is
arguable that the 225 percent increase was a result of a change in the norm concerning the
propriety of such a dissent.
"'8d at 181.
14Id. at 186-88.
"'OGriswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court
Does Not Do, 60 CoRNELL L. REv. 335, 339-40 (1975).
15id. at 338-44.
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important screener of appeals to the Court other than the Justices
themselves, has been forced to act in accordance with Casper and Posner's
self-limitation hypothesis. As Griswold once said, "We are . . .suffering

materially, both in terms of individual justice and in terms of the
institutional effectiveness of an appellate system, from a serious lack of
'1 2
nationally binding appellate capacity in this country."'
Raw statistics also do not explain the manner in which the Justices use
the screening process. The Freund Report assumed that the process is used
to separate the worthy from the unworthy cases. This assumption, however,
does not state whether there are certain types of cases worthy of certiorari
which are consistently denied review. The screening process, like the
Court's docket, might expose a policymaking bias.
When discussing whether the Court will grant the writ of certiorari,
one might assume that Rule 19 is the controlling standard:
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered."3
The list of reasons includes: 1) when the court of appeals decides a point of
local law in conflict with local interpretations; 2) when the court of appeals
departs from, or sanctions a departure from, the usual course of judicial
proceedings; 3)when a conflict between circuits exists; 4) when a lower
court ruling conflicts with a Supreme Court ruling; and 5) when the case
concerns an important question on which the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled. 154 Despite these standards, 33.1 percent of the certiorari petitions
granted during the 1956-1958 Terms gave no reason for the grant, while
20.1 percent stated that the writ was granted to decide the issue presented.
Of the remaining 46.8 percent which were accompanied by Rule 19 reasons,
56.9 percent cited the issue's importance,15 5 thus hardly aiding lawyers in
deciding whether to file a petition for the writ in future cases.
If one cannot find a policymaking or other bias in the explanation
given by the Court itself, indirectly observable cues must be examined. In a
series of articles, Harper suggested that the Court examined the justice of
the lower court decisions, the number of similar cases litigated or likely to
1521d.

at 349. But see Statement of Judge Friendly,

COMM. ON REv., SECOND PHASE,

supra

note 30, at 209-10.
15 3
Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin & Rosen, The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction:
Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 113 (Schubert ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
Supreme Court's Cert. Jurisdiction].
4

151d.
5

1 1d. at 114-15. See generally Prettyman, Petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court - A
Primerfor Hopeful Neophytes, 51 VA. L. REv. 582 (1965); Prettyman, Opposing Certiorariin
the U.S. Supreme Court, 61 VA. L. REv. 197 (1975).
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be litigated, the number of people affected by the decision, and the severity
of the penalty in a criminal case. 156 Gibbs, on the other hand, suggested
that the Justices looked first for jurisdictional defects and denied the
petition if any were present. If no jurisdictional defects appeared and if it
would not be tactically unsound to review a case, the Court then sorted the
cases into "yes," "no," and "gray" areas. Finally, if tentative examination
showed that the lower court decision in a "gray" case was incorrect, the
Justices would grant the petition. 157 Of course, the basic problem with this
theory is that the process would be too time consuming if used upon every
petition.
One recent study has posited the use of cues and is based upon three
hypotheses: 1) Rule 19 is an unsatisfactory explanation of the Court's
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction; 2) certiorari petitions are so numerous
that the Justices do not give more than cursory attention to a majority of
them; and 3) a large share of the petitions are totally frivolous. 5 8 The
authors of the study theorized that if the Court granted the writ in 15-17
percent of the 40-60 percent nonfrivolous Appellate Docket cases, then 2543 percent of those petitions which have at least one cue would be granted
the writ. 59 Using a sample of Appellate Docket cases from the 1947-1958
Terms, they tested the following cues in order to note if their presence in
the petition led to the petition's being granted the writ more often than
those petitions in which different cues were present: federal government as a
party; dissension between judges on the court below or between two or
more courts; a civil liberties issue; and an economic issue. They found that
the different granting rates were statistically significant for all of the cues
except for the presence of an economic issue. By far the most significant
statistic was the first; when the federal government favored granting the
160
writ, 47.1 percent of such cases were accepted by the Court.
Thus, it would appear that a careful examination of the growth of the
Court's docket and of the screening process demonstrates that the Court
plays a selective policymaking role. One might well argue that settling
1s6See note 123 supra.
"'TGibbs, Certiorari: Its Diagnosis and Cure, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 131 (1955). See also
Schubert, Policy Without Law: An Extension of the CertiorariGame, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 284
(1962); Hanus, Denial of Certiorariand Supreme Court Policy-Making, 17 AM. U.L. REV.41
(1967).
"'Supreme Court's Cert. Jurisdiction, supra note 153, at 118-19.
5 The 40-60 percent figure was derived from the remarks made by Chief Justice Hughes
and Justice Harlan. See note 129 supra.
16Supreme Court's Cert. Jurisdiction,supra note 153, at 119-27. The 47.1 percent figure
could be attributable to both the presence of the federal government as a party and the
Solicitor General's screening of appealable cases. Two later studies confirmed only the
importance of the first cue. Zimmerman, The Decision to Decide: A StatisticalAnalysis of the
Preliminary Decision-Making Process of the U.S. Supreme Court (1970) (unpublished
dissertation University of California at Riverside); Ulmer, Hintze & Kirklosky, The Decision
to Grant or Deny Certiorari:Further Consideration of Cue Theory, 6 LAw & Soc'Y REv.637
(1972). One study used the 1955 Term pool of petitions but deleted from this pool those
petitions which the Justices, in conference, decided were too frivolous to be considered. Ulmer,
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intercircuit conflicts could be encompassed within this role. The point,
however, is that settling such conflicts is not one of the policy areas in
which the Justices have chosen to concentrate their valuable time. There is
a caseload problem, but raw statistics simply do not uncover its essential
nature. The problem is not one of too many worthy cases and of too little
time; the problem is that the Jnstices execute one important role to the near
exclusion of other important roles. Any proposals advanced to alleviate the
situation must be directed at the true problem.
B.

Proposals to Aid the Supreme Court

By extending the studies performed by Casper and Posner and the
Commission on Revision, one should theoretically be able to identify those
classes of cases which systematically are reviewed either insufficiently or not
at all by the Court. Such identification need not be overly concerned with
the exact number of cases because a case which may appear to an observer
to be a conflict ripe for resolution nevertheless may appear to a Justice to
be too unrefined for resolution. Once identified, a committee for each class
of cases could be formed within the Judicial Conference so that circuit
judges, who perhaps best know which conflicts present serious problems to
the uniform application of national law, could either informally advise or
61
formally certify to the Court selected cases from these classes.
Another minor proposal is to empower the Court to use a limited grant
of the writ of certiorari. This might enhance the Court's policymaking role
and also might enable it to hear other classes of cases now insufficiently
reviewed. Bice, a proponent of granting this power, has noted that the
Court would be able to deal with issues it believes to be important and
would not be distracted by minor side issues. 62 The use of such a limited
grant of the writ might also encourage prospective petitioners to discard the
shotgun approach in their certiorari petitions. 163 Bice admitted that the
Hintze and Kirklosky used Justice Burton's docket book in order to note which cases ivere
deemed too frivolous to be placed on the conference list. Using the same hypothesis as that
used in Supreme Court's Cert. Jurisdiction,supra note 153, the study found that the ratio of
grants to denials increased from one in ten, to one in three. The important question was how
a case is placed on the Court's conference list. FurtherConsiderationof Cue Theory, supra,at
639-40. In another study, Ulmer clearly demonstrated that the decisions to deny or to grant the
writ of certiorari varied among the Justices and that the four cues were positively correlated
with the certiorari votes of at least one Justice in the 1947-56 period. Ulmer, Revising the
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Mere Administrative Reform or Substantive Policy
Change? 58 MINN. L. REV. 121, 139-52 (1973). See notes 183-86 infra & text accompanying.
1 1
6 For a detailed analysis of the structure and operation of the Judicial Conference, see P.
FISH, POLTICrS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 228-300 (1973). See also Carp. The
Scope and Function of Intra-CircuitJudicial Communication: A Case Study of the Eighth
Circuit,
6 LAw 8c Soc'Y REv. 405 (1972).
162Bice, The Limited Grant of Certiorariand the Justification of Judicial Review, 1975
Wis. 63
L. REV. 343, 343-45 [hereinafter cited as Justification of Judicial Review].
1 1d. at 343-45, 358-62. Bice found that less than ten percent of the Court's orders
granting certiorari for the 1961-71 Terms delineated any questions for counsel. Id. at 357.
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counterargument to this proposal emphasizes that the federal courts,
pursuant to Article III, are required to review only "cases and controversies." Also, a question concerning the denial of due process might arise
from the differential burden placed upon the party who would benefit from
the Court's decision on the merits of the avoided issue. He noted, however,
that a statute presently provides for certification to the Court of issues, not
whole cases. 164 Furthermore, such problems might be outweighed by the
saving of judicial time, the possible improvement in the quality of the
Court's decisionmaking, and the realization and enhancement of the
Court's policymaking role. Finally, Bice correctly noted that the traditional
justification of judicial review expressed in Marbury v. Madison,165 that it
is the duty of a court to deal with all relevant issues in a case, really applies
166
more to a trial court than to an appellate court with discretionary review.
One of the leading proposals intended to counter the caseload problem is
found in the Freund Report. The study group, after rejecting proposals to
limit the range of cases that the Court could hear, rejected proposals to use
panels of three Justices or to increase reliance upon a senior staff to
perform the screening process. 167 It also rejected the concept of a National
Court of Review, composed of 15 judges divided into three panels to hear
civil, criminal, and administrative appeals. Under this proposal the
Supreme Court would be able to review only those cases actually reviewed
6
by the Court of Review.
Instead, the study group's plan would institutionalize the screening
process outside of the Supreme Court, in a National Court of Appeals. The
new court would be staffed by seven circuit judges, sitting for limited and
staggered three-year terms. The court would have the same appellate
jurisdiction as the Supreme Court, and any denial of review by the new
court would be final. The National Court of Appeals could certify an
important intercircuit conflict case to the Supreme Court or decide the case
itself, a decision which would then be final. While the Supreme Court
would still exercise its Rule 19 jurisdiction in regard to certified cases, the
new court would be expected to grant certiorari in approximately 400 cases.
Thus, in theory, the Supreme Court, after screening only these 400 cases,
would refer the less important cases to the new court and would retain the
16428 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1970).
1655 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
166 Justificationof Judicial Review, supra note 162, at 390-93. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
U.S. 288,
167The study group obviously looked with some disfavor upon the current pooling of law
clerks for screening purposes by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and White. Concerning the better use of staff personnel in the screening process,
see Stockmeyer, Rx for the CertiorariCrisis:A More ProfessionalStaff, 59 A.B.A.J. 846 (1973);
Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 787, 790 (1974); Black, The National Court of
Appeals:
An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883, 895-98 (1974).
68
1 FREUND REPORT, supra note 122, at 10-18.
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more important cases for its own decision. While the Court could review
the lower national court's decisions (except in intercircuit conflict cases),
the study group expected the Supreme Court to review few such decisions.1 69
Without really examining the policy implications of such an institutional
reform, the study group concluded its discussion of the new court:
Again, some measure of loss of control by the Supreme Court itself is
inevitable if the Court's burden is to be lessened. We believe this
recommendation involves the least possible loss of control. 70
Though not without influential supporters, including Chief Justice
Burger, the study gr6up's plan has been subjected to much justified
criticism. 17' First, the study group obviously did not discuss with all of the

Justices the actual screening methods which they employ. Justice Brennan,
one of the few Justices who personally reads all of the certiorari petitions,
believes that the screening process does not compromise case deliberation
because many of the petitions are frivolous and may be disposed of very
quickly. He has also noted that the first conference of the Term usually
deals with about one quarter of all of the petitions for that particular Term
and that only 30 percent of all accepted cases are actually discussed in
72
conferences throughout the Term.
Second, as Justice Brennan also noted, experience in screening cases
equalizes the increased filings load.173 Such experience also enables a
Justice to "feel" which cases are worthy of certiorari. As Justice Harlan has
stated: "Frequently the question whether a case is 'certworthy' is more a
matter of feel than of previously ascertainable rules."' 174 It is interesting to
note that some of the newer members of the Court have been the leaders
demanding changes in the screening process.
Third, as Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Gressman have
noted, the National Court of Appeals will really screen only those frivolous
cases upon which the Justices now spend little time. The 400 cases referred
1691d. at 19-23. See generally Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1301
(1974). 0
17 FREUND REPORT, supra note 122, at 23.
'Burger & Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice BurgerDefends
Freund Study Groups Composition and Proposal,59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Warren Attacks, Burger Defends]. The criticism does not, however, apply to all of the study
group's recommendations. For example, the study group correctly noted that some of the
Court's docket problem would be alleviated by repeal of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1970), which
allows direct appeals to the Court from three-judge district courts. Thus, while such cases
constituted only 2.7. percent of the 1971 docket, they constituted 22 percent of the cases argued

orally72in the 1969-71 Terms.

FREUND REPORT,

supra note 122, at 29.

1 Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal"Fundamentally
Unnecessary and Ill-Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835, 837 (1973).
1731d.

174Warren Attacks, Burger Defends, supra note 171, at 728.

1976]

FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

to the Supreme Court will consist of the difficult cases upon which the
175
Justices presumably now spend most of their screening time.
in some
justice
Fourth, screening allows the Court to perform summary
176
cases while retaining policy flexibility. By reviewing all of the filings, the
Justices believe that they can remain somewhat attuned to the pulse of the
legal order. Indeed, Justice Douglas has stated that selecting cases across the
broad spectrum of issues presented is the very heart of the judicial process
and that "in many ways it is the most important work we do."' 77 In
addition to possibly becoming isolated from various naunces and trends in
complete categories
the law, the Court might be foreclosed from reviewing
78
of cases by a hostile National Court of Appeals.
Most importantly, the Justices would not be able to establish national
priorities in the constitutional and legal orderings. They would neither be
able to find important new issues by themselves, nor be able to accept cases
179
in order to explain or to pursue implications of precedents. In reality, the
problem is simply that the Justices will not be able to transmit to the
judges on the National Court of Appeals any comprehensive concrete
standards to use in the screening process. Such transmission would also be
made more difficult by the temporary nature of the panel on the proposed
court.
Thus, control of the ultimate decisional process depends upon control
of both the scope and the nature of the questions to be decided by the
Supreme Court. Screening is not a preliminary or ancillary task that can
successfully be granted to another gatekeeper with the Court's subsequently
experiencing only "a measure of loss of control."' 180 A substantive change
affecting fundamental values and power relationships might result from
ostensibly administrative and procedural changes. The question is not if
subjectivity will be used in screening cases, but rather whose subjectivity
will be used. 8 1 If the "rule of four" portrays idiosyncratic voting patterns
by the Justices, the question naturally arises whether the values of the
82
judges on the National Court of Appeals will match those of the Justices.'
In his attempt to answer this question, Ulmer posited that if the
Justices differed among themselves in their certiorari petition voting
patterns, then they would differ from that of any other set of judges. Also, if
17-id. at 726; Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal
"Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill-Advised." supra note 172, at 838-39; Gressman, The
National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253, 254-55 (1973).
176Supreme Court's Caseload, supra note 121, at 368-69, observes that the new court's
power to settle intercircuit conflicts might mean that it would not be able to decide other types
of cases which the Supreme Court now is forced to reject.
'"Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 175 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
178Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, supra note 175, at 256-57.
179Id.; Warren Attacks, BurgerDefends, supra note 171, at 727-28.
"80Black, The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal,supra note 167, at 889-91.
"'Ulmer, Revising the Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: Mere AdministrativeReform
or Substantive Policy Change?, 58 MINN. L. REv. 121, 136-37 (1973).
1I82d. at 136-39.
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the values that influenced such voting could be identified, one could then
know which policy areas would be in jeopardy from a new court. 183 Using
the four cue variables already enumerated, 184 Ulmer sampled one third of
the certiorari petitions discussed in conferences during the 1947-1956
Terms. By using Justice Burton's docket book he was able to record not
only the whole Court's vote, but also the votes of individual Justices.
Utilizing various statistical methods, Ulmer found that there was some
significant and non-random positive association with at least one variable
for 11 of the 15 Justices who served during this period. 185 By controlling
three variables in order to note the effect of only the fourth variable, Ulmer
was able to note that the federal government cue showed the most
186
significant influence upon a sizeable number of the Justices.
Obviously, establishing a new National Court of Appeals might well
change the subject matter mix of the cases chosen for Supreme Court
review or might restructure various group and interest relationships which
depend upon court-made policies. The Supreme Court might well become,
in effect, an inferior national court.
In order to forestall this one other proposal hypothesizes a Court which
continues to screen its own cases but which actually decides cases within
specific categories. Kurland has proposed: 1) each Justice screen and make
recommendations concerning one ninth of the petitions for his brethren; 2)
the Court publish a petition dead list in order to inform counsel about
which categories of cases it will not review; and 3) the Court limit itself to
constitutional cases. 187 While this proposal obviously narrows the Court's
policymaking role from its present scope, it would not necessarily alleviate
much of the caseload problem. Many litigants might simply rephrase their
petitions so that their cases appear to be of constitutional dimensions.
In a similar vein, Chief Judge Haynsworth has proposed that a
National Court of Appeals be formed to expeditiously hear criminal
appeals and othe postconviction suits.

88

This proposal has been perceived

both as an excessive response to the problem of prisoner petitions' 89 and as
based upon imponderables concerning the continuing caseload of the new
183

1d. at 139-40.

184See note 160 supra & text accompanying.
185Ulmer, Revising the Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: Mere Administrative Reform
Policy Change?, 58 MINN. L. REV. 121, 141-48 (1973).
or Substantive
18
61d. at 148-52.
87
1 Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 616, 628, 631 (1974).
' 88Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841
(1973); Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate
System, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 598-607 (1974); Statement of Chief Judge Clement F.

Haynsworth, Jr.,
101.

89

COMM. ON REV., SECOND PHASE,

Vol. I, supra note 30, at 90, 91-92, 95-97, 98-

' Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59

(1974).

CORNELL

L.

REV. 634,

638-40
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court. 190 If the Supreme Court refuses to review many of the new court's
decisions and if the new court declines to review marginal cases, the docket
of this National Court of Appeals might well decline to a level which
would not warrant the court's separate existence.
The most recently proposed plan to meet the caseload problem appears
to take into account both the real nature of the growth of the Court's
docket and the policy importance of the screening process. As set forth by
the Commission on Revision, the most salient feature of the plan is that the
Supreme Court would continue to initially screen all filed cases and that it
191
could subsequently refer cases to a new inferior national tribunal.
Pursuant to this plan the new National Court of Appeals would consist of
seven permanent judges sitting en banc in Washington, D.C. The Supreme
Court would have the following options with regard to. appellate jurisdiction cases arising on certiorari petition: 1) it could retain the case and
decide it on the merits; 2) it could deny the writ and terminate the case; 3) it
could deny the writ and refer the case to the National Court of Appeals for
decision on the merits; or 4) it could deny the writ and refer the case to the
new court, while allowing that court the option to accept or to reject the
case. With a case arising on appeal, the Supreme Court could retain the
case and could decide it on the merits, or could refer 92the case to the
National Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.
Cases filed in the courts of appeals, Court of Claims, or Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals could be transferred to the National Court of Appeals
if: 1) the case turns on a rule of federal law and the federal courts are in
conflict; 2) the case turns on a federal law or rule applicable to a recurring
factual situation and the advantages of a transfer outweigh the disadvantages; or 3) the case turns on a federal rule announced by the National
Court of Appeals, and there is a substantial question concerning its correct
interpretation in the instant case. The National Court of Appeals could use
its discretion to either accept or to reject a transfer case and the decision
would be nonreviewable.193
This plan assumes that the Supreme Court will refer about 150 cases
each Term to the new court and that these cases will mostly concern those
-areas currently neglected by the Court, such as tax, NLRB, antitrust, and
diversity suits. Constitutional cases of less significance might also be
referred to the National Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court will be able
19
oSupreme Court's Caseload, supra note 121 at 370-71. One might anticipate that the
flood of habeas corpus petitions will recede slightly due to the recent Supreme Court decision
in Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). However, lawyers could maintain this level of
petitions by asserting that a full and fair hearing concerning the search and seizure was not

available at trial.
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REv., REcOmMENDATIONS, supra note 70, at 30-34. For related proposals, see
Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, supra note 31; Grisiold, Rationing Justice-The
1 COMM. ON

Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, supra note 150.
Supreme
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to review all decisions of the new court, although it is expected that the
Court will review relatively few. Nevertheless, the decisions of the new
court will still be binding nationally. 194
The plan as thus envisioned might greatly remedy the docket and
screening problems discussed throughout this section. The Court would
still be able to remain attuned to the national legal pulse while presumably
providing for more national review than was previously possible. Furthermore, of the sitting or retired Justices, only Justices Douglas and Brennan
have as yet rejected this plan. 195
IV.

CONCLUSION

Underlying this paper has been the assumption that institutional
change of the federal appellate court system can have a profound effect
upon the roles played by these courts. Thus, administrative reforms
stressing efficiency within the courts of appeals will allow these courts to
dispose of more cases. Such efficiency, however, might also impair the
integrity and quality of the resulting decisions. Furthermore, by allowing
these courts to dispose of more cases, the reforms will enlarge the scope of
the courts' policymaking role and will add to the potential for multiple,
conflicting interpretations of law. Of course, this same potential will arise
if judges are added to the circuits or if new circuits are added. Thus, either
option might, in the end, add to the already very real docket problem of the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court might be able to cope with these problems by
reformulating its policymaking priorities. It will not, however, be able to
cope with all of the problems, and thus the courts of appeals will effectively
become the final expositors of the law in those areas which the Supreme
Court cannot control. No matter how wide the "ripples" from Supreme
Court decisions extend, there will be salient areas of national law for which
the courts of appeals will be the courts of last resort. Nevertheless, the
96
Commission on Revision's proposal, recently submitted to the Senate,
might aid in breaking the circle.
The added capacity of the federal court system to handle its caseloads
may actually lead to an increase in filings at every level. Thus, being
continuously overloaded or at least continuously complaining about being
overloaded and overworked may be the best manner by which the judges of
194

1d. at 38-39.
SId. at 179-80. Justice White, who would prefer not to have the additional work of
selecting 150 cases for the new court, has approved the plan because he believes that this task
will be lightened by the Supreme Court's power to refer cases to the new court for the exercise
of that court's discretionary acceptance or denial. Id. at 181-82.
' 96A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on S. 2762 and
S. 3423 in May, 1976, while H.R. 11218 was pending in a House Judiciary Committee
subcommittee as of August, 1976.
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these courts can stem the tide of frivolous appeals. 197 Federal judges at all
levels might also increase their use of various measures which are at their
disposal in order to penalize those who bring frivolous suits or appeals. 98
It is difficult, however, to view most of the above proposed reforms as
anything other than temporary cures for an illness with a source very deep
in the foundations of our legal and social order. Quite simply, too many
issues are brought to the federal courts and indeed to the state courts. Judge
Friendly was quite correct in stating that the only viable, semi-permanent
solution to the caseload problem of the federal judicial system, including
the district courts, is to revise and to redistribute the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 99 Litigation which logically ought to be adjudicated in state
courts, such as diversity suits, should be pared from. the jurisdictional
purview of the federal courts. 2 0 0 Friends of both the state and federal
judiciaries must eventually decide if there are competent, alternate methods
of resolving some of the societal conflicts which are presently brought to
the courts. In the end, an examination of the possible restructuring of the
state and federal judiciaries must weigh not only the systems' capacities
against the general societal need to resolve certain types of conflict in an
orderly manner, but must also weigh the systems' capacities against the
20
ability of other modes of social control to resolve these conflicts. '

197See, e.g.,

COMM. ON REV., RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note 70, at 172-78; Chief Justice

Burger Calls for Action on Several Proposals, 61 A.B.A.J. 303 (1975); Burger, Report on the
Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1973).
'"8For example, increased use of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule
38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
199Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, supra note 189, at 640-46; H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTON: A GENERAL VIEW, 75-196 passim (1973). Such redistribution
might include establishing specialized courts, such as a Patent Court, to handle diverted cases.
Id. at 153-96.
2°Of course one can argue that the state courts are already overloaded, while the obvious
retort asserts that the reform and restructuring of these courts can aid them in coping with the
problem.
2°'See generally, Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, 9 LAw &:Soc'Y REV. 95
(1974); Sarat 9c Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the Mobilization of
Adjudication, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1200 (1975).

